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The Ecological Dimension of Natural Selection 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper I argue that we should pay extra attention to the ecological 
dimension of natural selection. By this I mean that we should view natural 
selection primarily as acting on the outcomes of the interactions organisms have 
with their environment which influences their relative reproductive output. A 
consequence of this view is that natural selection is not (directly) sensitive to 
what system of inheritance which ensures reoccurrences of organism-
environment interactions over generations. I end by showing the consequences 
of this view when looking at how processes like niche construction and the 
Baldwin effect relate to natural selection.  
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1. Introduction. The principle of natural selection is the theoretical cornerstone of 
evolutionary theory. In the philosophy of biology, we can delineate four different, but 
related, main discussions of this principle; first, on what the sufficient conditions are for its 
occurrence (e.g., Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Second, on the appropriate means 
of quantifying the influence of natural selection on the distribution of variants in 
populations over time (e.g., Millstein 2009; Otsuka 2016). Third, on whether selection can 
be counted as a cause or is more appropriately interpreted as a statistical summary of 
multiple underlying causes and not a cause of evolution in itself (e.g., Matthen and Ariew 
2002; Ramsey 2013ab; Walsh 2010). Fourth, on whether selection can act on multiple 
levels and what the relevant units of selection are, and if any of these are privileged (e.g., 
Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976; Okasha 2006).  
Another debate, which is related to all of the aforementioned debates, centers 
around the metaphysics of evolution. In this debate we can identify two main camps; a 
molecular, or “gene-centered” metaphysics (e.g., Dawkins 1976, 1982) and an ecological, 
or “organism-centered” metaphysics (e.g., West-Eberhard 2003; Walsh 2015). Standard 
textbook evolutionary biology usually has a “molecular” metaphysics, in that the 
fundamental units of evolution are genes. On an “ecological” metaphysics of evolution, the 
fundamental unit of evolution are organisms.  
Walsh (2015), amongst others (see references below), has recently argued that the 
Modern Synthesis misrepresents the metaphysics of evolution by viewing it primarily as a 
molecular phenomenon, instead of an ecological one. This is largely due to what Walsh 
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calls “the marginalisation of the organism that have taken hold under the Modern 
Synthesis” (Walsh 2015, x). This has been a complaint of many biologists and 
philosophers over the last decades (e.g., Lewontin 1983, Piaget 1978; Odling-Smee et al. 
2003; Oyama 2000; West-Eberhard 2003) and is a central complaint of the proponents of 
an extended evolutionary synthesis (Pigliucci and Müller 2010). Theoretical and empirical 
work taking a more ecological or organism-centered approach to understanding evolution 
and development has also recently gained some traction under the headings of eco-devo 
(ecological developmental biology) and eco-evo-devo (ecological evolutionary 
developmental biology). For example, West-Eberhard (2003), Sultan (2015) and Gilbert 
and Epel (2015) have made a great effort to establish how both evolutionary and 
developmental trajectories are significantly influenced by, and sometimes crucially 
dependent on, particular organism-environment interactions.  
This paper is a philosophical contribution to what an “organism-centered”, or 
“ecological”, metaphysics of evolution might do to our understanding of natural selection. 
I begin from the view that natural selection is primarily an ecological process. By this I 
mean that natural selection is a process where organism-environment interactions are what 
is preferentially selected. Further, natural selection acts on the outcomes of these 
interactions. This is not a novel view and has been suggested before (Lehrman 1970; 
Brandon 1990; Rosenberg 1983). However, I will take this a step further and argue that 
this also means that natural selection is not directly sensitive to which system of 
inheritance ensures the reoccurrence of such interactions, be it genetic, epigenetic, 
behavioral, cultural, or symbolic (Jablonka and Lamb 2014). Natural selection acts on the 
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outcomes of organism-environment interactions and the frequency and likelihood of their 
reoccurrence in subsequent generations. 
However, this does not mean that I equate the importance of each system of 
inheritance. A genetic system of inheritance is an important prior condition for there to be 
other systems of inheritance in most, if not all, organisms. Further, most of morphological 
and physiological evolution seem to be primarily under genetic control. The point is rather 
that this happens “unbeknownst” to natural selection. To use some helpful terminology 
from Sober (1984), we can say that there is selection for the ecological interactions that 
yields highest relative fitness in a population, while there is selection of the relevant genes 
that contribute to those interactions because of the high-fidelity-inheritance properties of 
the genetic system of inheritance in reliably producing offspring which have similar 
interactions.  
 
2. Selection on Passive Objects by Environmental Filtration. Let us begin by looking in 
more detail at the “standard” molecular metaphysics of the Modern Synthesis. In most 
textbooks on evolutionary biology, one is likely to find a definition of evolution as the 
changes to allele (or gene) frequencies in a population over time (e.g., Futuyma and 
Kickpatrick 2017). Furthermore, the conditions for evolution by natural selection to occur 
(e.g., Lewontin 1970); inheritance, variation, and differences in fitness, is often interpreted 
in a genetic manner. That is, any variation in fitness, which is due to differences in the 
performance of varying phenotypes in relation to the local (and shared) selective 
environment, is only acted on by natural selection insofar as the genetic underpinning of 
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that variation steadily expresses the relevant phenotype over generations. Since the genetic 
system of inheritance is privileged, in the sense that without it there would be (in most 
cases) no organism to be selected for in the first place, it makes perfect sense to define 
evolution as changes in the frequencies of genes in a population. And from this it easy to 
conceive of natural selection as being an agent which sorts different genetic variants based 
on their performance relative to their immediate environment. This rendition of natural 
selection construes it as an environmental process. The metaphor of a sieve or filtration is 
often invoked to describe this process (e.g., Sober 1984). Coupled with the view that the 
only phenotypic variation that matters for biological evolution is that which is the result of 
genetic variation, such metaphors engender a certain passivity on behalf of the organism. It 
essentially relegates the action of selection to be realized by certain (stable or changing) 
environmental configurations. Natural selection acts on those organisms that carry the 
appropriate genetic material to produce a phenotype that performs best (i.e., highest 
realized relative fitness) in relation to the relevant environmental configurations. Such a 
view of evolution by natural selection has been called asymmetrically externalist (Godfrey-
Smith 1996). It is asymmetric in the sense that the configurations of the environment are 
(presumed to be) explainable solely with reference to factors internal to the environmental 
system itself. While, on the other hand, the organisms which occupy these environments 
are explained (in terms of the phylogenetic history leading up to their capacity for 
occupying the environment) by reference to a combination of changes to the biological 
system (i.e., changes in the gene frequencies of the lineage(s) leading up to the relevant 
population) and the environmental configuration which the lineage(s) have experienced 
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over generations. It is externalist in the sense that the environmental configurations are 
what “trigger” the selection of the phenotype, while the changes to the gene frequencies in 
the population is a “structuring” cause of the selection event.1 The role of the organism in 
such explanations is that of a vehicle (Dawkins 1978), one that carries certain passengers 
(genes) to certain destinations (selection events). However, organisms are arguably not just 
an ensemble of genes, and their activity or behavior might influence their reproductive 
success and consequently the evolution of their lineage. How does an externalist and 
molecular (i.e., gene-centered) view of evolution deal with behavior?  
Standardly, in behavioral ecology (e.g., Krebs and Davies 1993) and the 
evolutionary explanations provided by behavioral genetics (e.g., Anholt and Mackay 
2010), organismic activity and behavior is treated as any other phenotypic trait. It is based 
on certain assumptions regarding the dispositional properties of genes in relation to 
behaviors and certain optimality measures (Krebs and Davies 1993). Generally speaking, 
organisms exhibiting behaviors that increase their fitness are selected for, and the 
disposition to exhibit the beneficial behavior in subsequent generations is assumed to be 
under genetic control—and can consequently be treated like any other phenotypic trait. 
The validity of these assumptions is not under question here. The point here is a conceptual 
one. It is about how we conceive of the relation between natural selection and the 
organisms exhibiting the relevant behavior. Let us do a thought experiment. Take an 
 
1 For the distinction between “structuring” and “triggering” causes, see Dretske (1988). For 
an example of its relevance for evolutionary theory, see Ramsey (2016). 
 7 
imaginary species like the tarbutniks from Avital and Jablonka (2000). The individuals of 
this species have completely identical and non-changing genetic make-up. In other words, 
it is a species without genetic variation among the individuals. However, let us assume that 
they can differ in their behavior, i.e. that there is still phenotypic variation. Let us then 
imagine that some individuals forage fruits to supplement their diet, while others obtain 
their nutrients from only eating grass. This then leads to the fruit-foraging individuals 
having a more energy-rich diet, which increases their reproductive output. Let us further 
imagine that the fruit foraging techniques are passed on vertically through parental 
guidance (i.e., learning) and that the transmission of this behavior from parent to offspring 
enjoys a high level of fidelity. If we view natural selection as a process that sorts genetic 
variation, then there is no response to selection in this scenario. However, this seems 
wrong. Surely, natural selection still acts on the individuals that forage fruit to supplement 
their diet if this increases their reproductive output. Thus, there is a response to selection in 
the population—the number of fruit-foraging individuals increases and fruit-foraging 
behavior spreads throughout the population.  
 While in this thought experiment natural selection does not lead to biological 
evolution (in the sense that the gene frequencies in the population remain unchanged), 
natural selection has still occurred. And while it might be true that for natural selection to 
bring about adaptive biological evolution there must selection amongst different genetic 
variants in a population, there is still natural selection amongst the phenotypes of our 
imagined population. The strength and direction of the selection for the fruit foraging 
behavior is dependent on the fidelity and transience of the behavioral inheritance system.  
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Even though there are no organisms like the tarbutniks in the real world and we do 
not know exactly to what extent difference in behavior and capacity for learning is linked 
to and/or governed by genetic variation in a population, the point about the natural 
selection being an ecological process still stands. Natural selection is not directly sensitive 
to what causes the phenotypic variation available for selection to act on, just the outcome 
of different interactions between phenotypes and their environments. This is an important 
consideration for both biologists and philosophers taking a more organism-centered 
approach. These argue that organisms are not merely passive objects of selection, but 
active subjects—or agents—in their own evolution (e.g., Lewontin 1983; Odling-Smee 
2003; Bateson 2004). Let us now turn to these organism-centered views, and in particular 
two processes where the activities of organisms play an important part in shaping 
evolutionary dynamics—the Baldwin effect and niche construction.  
 
3. Organisms as Agents in Evolutionary Theory. Over the course of the last decades 
there has been an increasing tension in evolutionary biology, culminating in an overarching 
debate surrounding whether an extended evolutionary synthesis is needed (Müller and 
Pigliucci 2010, Laland et al. 2014; Wray et al. 2014). A central part of this debate concerns 
the role that behavior, and organismic activity more generally, has on evolutionary 
dynamics. The question of how the activities and behaviors of organisms can alter the 
action of natural selection has a long history. It could, arguably, be said to date all the way 
back to Lamarck (Avital and Jablonka 2000). Alternatively, we can trace it back to the 
introduction of organic selection (also called the Baldwin effect) in the late 19th century 
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(Baldwin 1896a, 1896b; Morgan 1896; Osborn 1896). Organic selection refers to an 
evolutionary process that can turn acquired characters into congenital ones. More 
precisely, it refers to a three-step process; first, organisms can through their interactions 
with the environment systematically produce behavioral, morphological, or physiological 
modifications that are not hereditary, but increase the fitness of the organism that acquires 
them. Second, there is genetic variation in the population producing hereditary characters 
similar to characters that are acquired by the organisms through their environmental 
interactions. Third, this genetic variation is acted on by natural selection and subsequently 
spread in the population over the course of generations. The character was initially 
individually acquired, but is in time turned into a hereditary character (Simpson 1953). 
This process has recently garnered more attention in evolutionary biology. In the works of 
the late Patrick Bateson (2004, 2017a, 2017b; Bateson and Gluckman 2011) this process is 
revisited in light of what we have learned about social learning, transmission and non-
genetic systems of inheritance over the last decades. Bateson refers to the Baldwin effect 
as the adaptability driver (Bateson 2017a). By this he means that, more often than what we 
initially may have thought, behavioral plasticity (behavior which is the result of stimuli or 
interactions with the environment, and not determined by genetic factors) is actually 
crucial in initiating adaptive responses to environmental challenges.2  
 
2 A more general rendition of this view, where not only behavioral but also morphological 
and physiological acquired characters are what initiates evolutionary change, is referred to 
as ‘plasticity-first evolution’ (e.g. Levis and Pfennig 2016).  
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Another example of organismic activity altering evolutionary dynamics can be seen 
in niche construction theory (Odling-Smee 2003). Niche construction refers to cases where 
organisms modify selection pressures by actively altering their environment or their 
relationship to it. The paradigmatic example being the beaver, which significantly alters 
the local environment by building a dam, and consequently altering the selective 
environment it experiences. Both the Baldwin effect and niche construction are central 
elements in the discussion of an extended evolutionary synthesis. The argument for an 
extended synthesis from niche construction theory is that viewing organisms as merely 
passive objects that are filtered by natural selection neglects the active role of the organism 
in its evolution (Odling-Smee 2003). They see niche construction as an evolutionary 
process whereby the activities of organisms counter or direct the action of natural 
selection. Consequently, they argue that niche construction should be seen as a potentially 
equally important evolutionary process as natural selection itself. The same is often said of 
the Baldwin effect. It constitutes a corollary process of selection (viz. organic selection) 
and is often considered to be an evolutionary mechanism or process (Bateson 2017a, 
2017b).  
According to the adherents of an extended evolutionary synthesis, we need to pay more 
attention to the neglected process of niche construction, organic selection and other 
processes where organisms play an active role in evolution. Allowing more processes to be 
considered evolutionary processes is one way we can do this (Scott-Phillips et al. 2014; 
Laland 2015). However, this solution has been met with some skepticism (e.g. Welch 
2017; Scott-Phillips et al. 2014), as it is unclear whether granting something the status of 
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an evolutionary process actually increases our understanding of evolution. Another 
problem with viewing niche construction as an evolutionary process that counteracts 
natural selection is that it still treats natural selection as an asymmetrically externalist 
environmental process. If niche construction “counteracts” the action of selection, 
selection must be a process that runs from the environment to the organism. Instead, we 
should start from an ecological metaphysics of evolution (Walsh 2015). 
 
4. An Ecological Metaphysics of Evolution and Organism-Environment Interactions. 
When Walsh (2015) calls for an ecological metaphysics of evolution, he highlights that we 
might have missed a lot in our understanding of evolution by not seeing organisms as 
active (and purposive) agents in their environments. Treating organisms as biological 
agents prior to evolutionary agents is a necessary step in the direction of an ecological 
metaphysics (Walsh 2015). Biological entities are entities that interact with their 
environment. The relationship between the organism and the environment is crucial and in 
a sense prior to both the organism and environment themselves. Without any organisms 
there would be no environments, and conversely, without environments there would be no 
organisms (Lewontin 2000). From an ecological metaphysics of evolution, then, the 
fundamental unit is that of organism-environment interactions. Evolution concerns changes 
in the types of interactions there are. Mostly these interactions change in virtue of changes 
to the organism itself, for example by organism evolving faculties with which they interact 
with their environment in novel ways. Such kinds of changes to organism-environment 
interaction are captured by the theoretical framework offered by the modern synthesis. 
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However, an environment can also change in such a way that organism-environment 
interactions change as a result, and more importantly, an organism can change the 
environment or its relationship to it such that the organism-environment interactions 
change (i.e., niche construction).  
 Natural selection, then, is the process whereby organism-environment interactions 
are preferentially selected. It is concerned with the outcomes of organism-environment 
interactions over the life-history of an organism (or at least to the end of its reproductive 
age) relative to those of its population. The strength of and response to selection is 
determined by the probability that advantageous interactions reoccur in subsequent 
generations. Consequently, advantageous hereditary traits (traits that are passed on through 
genetic inheritance) are more likely to spread than acquired traits whose likelihood of 
reoccurrence is lower. But it is in principle possible for selection to act on advantageous 
organism-environment interactions that are acquired (e.g., as a result of niche construction 
or behavioral plasticity).  
Take, for instance, gastrolith usage. Gastroliths are small stones that are ingested 
and then reside in the gastrointestinal tract of some animals. Carrying gastroliths is 
certainly an example of an acquired trait, as it is something the animal has to acquire from 
its environment to utilize. Usage of gastroliths is quite common among some groups of 
vertebrates and may serve a wide variety of different functions in relation to different 
environments (Wings 2007). For example, some have argued that in aquatic environments 
gastroliths might be used as ballast or for buoyancy control (Rondeau et al. 2005). While in 
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terrestrial environments some have argued that gastroliths may supply minerals and help 
with trituration and mixing of foodstuffs (Wings 2007).  
If, for instance, an organism enjoys a higher fitness relative to other members of its 
population as a result of having ingested gastroliths, natural selection will favor that 
individual. Further, let us say that this organism learnt to ingest gastroliths by observing its 
parents and continue the habit of ingesting such stones. If in the subsequent generations 
gastrolith ingestion is reliably transmitted through observational learning, and the fitness 
advantage is sufficiently high, natural selection could spread this trait throughout the 
population. Natural selection could also favor those who have a disposition for ingesting 
gastroliths, with or without observational learning, making it an acquired trait with a 
hereditary basis (which is an example of the Baldwin effect). For natural selection, 
however, the basis on which the gastrolith is ingested—be it by way of learning or 
instinct—is irrelevant as long as the stone is ingested. It is the outcome of the interaction—
e.g., the improved trituration of foodstuffs—which is conducive to the fitness advantage, 
not whether or not it is learnt or instinctual, as long as the stone is reliably ingested.3 More 
generally, we could say that the primary way in which genes matter for selection is in how 
conducive they are to the reliability and likelihood of advantageous organism-environment 
 
3 Of course, if all members of a population ingest gastroliths, and some do it instinctually 
while others need to learn it through observation, natural selection will most likely favor 
the instinctual response because the trait itself (i.e., gastrolith ingestion) is presumably 
transmitted with a higher fidelity if it is congenital rather than learned. 
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interactions to reoccur in subsequent generations. Taking this perspective on how natural 
selection acts, let us return to how we should interpret niche construction and the Baldwin 
effect. Are they different selective processes, as it is commonly argued?  
 
5. Niche Construction and the Baldwin Effect Revisited. Both niche construction and 
the Baldwin effect have been seen as distinct evolutionary mechanisms or processes (e.g., 
Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Bateson 2017a, 2017b). Some even go as far as saying that they 
are different selective processes, as when niche construction is interpreted as a process 
where organisms counteract natural selection by modifying selection pressures (Laland 
2015). The Baldwin effect is seen as a distinct selective process which operates on 
acquired traits until there is genetic variation present so natural selection can “take over” 
and consequently turn them into congenital traits.  
 I think these interpretations are misguided, and stem from viewing natural selection 
as a process of environmental filtration concerned with primarily with genes, i.e., from a 
“molecular” metaphysics of evolution. If we instead take the point of view introduced 
above, where natural selection is concerned with the outcomes of organism-environment 
interactions and their relative reoccurrence, niche construction and the Baldwin effect are 
ways in which adaptation can occur and consequently be selected for. Niche construction 
is one way in which an organism can achieve a fitness advantage relative to other members 
of its population, but it is not a process that is counteracting the effects of natural selection. 
As long as the niche constructing behavior reoccurs reliably and the altered ecological 
conditions are reliably transmitted across generations it is no different from any other 
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phenotypic trait in relation to natural selection. Acquired traits, and the Baldwin effect 
more generally, are also not selected initially by a process distinct from natural selection 
(i.e., organic selection). They are selected for by natural selection from their first 
occurrence, it is just a shift in the system of inheritance that is responsible for the 
reoccurrence of the trait. Sometimes, it makes sense to say that an acquired trait has 
become a congenital trait, as for instance when a learnt behavior has become instinctual. 
However, in the case discussed above, the ingestion of gastroliths, it is unclear if it can 
ever fully be a congenital trait, as the key feature of having that trait is to acquire a suitable 
rock from the environment (though the disposition can certainly be congenital). 
 Natural selection understood as a process acting on the outcome of reoccurring 
organism-environment interactions has the benefit of being compatible with the main 
insights of the modern synthesis, while also allowing for other cases to be included as 
ways in which organism-environment interactions can change and be acted on by selection, 
such as niche construction and the Baldwin effect. It explains why the genetic system of 
inheritance is so important—because it is a system which is necessary for the development 
of (most, if not all) phenotypes, and consequently for there to be any organism-
environment interactions at all. While simultaneously explaining how certain behavioral 
innovations, cultural traits, etc. can be selected for by natural selection, without being 
(directly) dependent on genetic variation or inheritance.  
  
6. Conclusion. I have argued that natural selection is standardly understood as a process of 
environmental filtration concerned primarily with genes. Further, I followed Walsh (2015) 
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in arguing that this stems from a gene-centered and externalist (“molecular”) metaphysics 
of evolution. If we instead opt for an ecological metaphysics of evolution our 
understanding of natural selection becomes different. On such a metaphysics of evolution, 
natural selection becomes a process that acts on the outcomes of the advantageous 
interactions an organism has with its environment during its life-history. As long as such 
interactions reoccur reliably in subsequent generations, natural selection will be insensitive 
as to what brings about these interactions, be it through genetic inheritance, social learning, 
cultural transmission, etc. A benefit of this view is that the ecological account of natural 
selection is compatible with the main insights from the modern synthesis, while also 
allowing for phenomena traditionally excluded from the modern synthesis, but emphasized 
by the extended evolutionary synthesis. Finally, the ecological view of natural selection 
can integrate some of these novel phenomena easily, without having to supplement and 
extend evolutionary theory with a host of new evolutionary processes.  
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